righteous habits. The question is, does the real righteousness that results from this infusion of righteous habits *justify* the believer before God, or are believers justified by the imputed righteousness of Christ *alone* (with the personal righteousness of the believer being a working out in this life the fruit of sanctification that grows from the believer's union with Christ the Righteous)? Notwithstanding the helpful clarity Davison offers regarding the often-misunderstood teaching of Trent, I find myself wondering if he believes there is a lot less daylight between Rome and Protestant Christianity than there actually is.

In sum, I highly recommend this book. The strength in *Participation in God* for students is that Davison offers an impressively broad curation of resources in the figures he interacts with. This book is a kind of field-consolidator for all those interested in Christian metaphysics. On this note, while Davison avoids marrying himself to any particular terminology, anyone remotely interested in conversations surrounding Classical Christian Theism, Christian Platonism, or the Great Tradition will be greatly helped by this book. Further, I would also recommend this work as a surprisingly fresh source of worshipful contemplation. While Davison does not pretend to write *Participation in God* as a "devotional" resource, properly speaking, it is nevertheless incredibly fruitful for Christian piety. This is the case for one simple reason: the participatory outlook Davison proposes here cannot but fill the conscientious reader with a profound sense of *gratitude*. We creatures are what we are *by divine gift*. We live and move and have our being in the triune God. Not only is this outlook true, it is also good and beautiful, and it rightly concludes with praise of the Father, Son, and Holy Spirit, who is one God, world without end. Amen.

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Richard of St. Victor, *Richard of Saint-Victor, On the Trinity: Prologue and Six Books*, ed. Jean Ribaillier, trans. Aage Rydstrøm-Poulsen. Brepolis Library of Christian Sources, vol 4. Turnhout, Belgium: Brepolis, 2021. 301 pp. English and Latin Edition. $70.00.

Richard of St. Victor has been a vital voice in classical Trinitarian theology. Influencing later authors including Aquinas, and likely John Calvin, this book marks the first attempt to render his work in English. This review has two focal points: Richard's teaching on the Trinity and the quality of the translated

text. Contending that Richard is a vital voice in the history of Trinitarian doctrine, and that the translation is highly useful though imperfect, this reviewer believes that this dual-language version of *De Trinitate* contributes to the church's continued reflection on and devotion to the Triune God. In particular, theological students, ministers, and those practicing their Latin will find much material to help them along in a relatively short space.

Richard's argument appears in six books, moving from modes of being in general, to divine simplicity and the divine attributes, from plurality in God to Trinity specifically, to defining personhood, into distinguishing personal properties, and finally to identifying the divine persons by their proper names. On the surface, this follows earlier models for doing Trinitarian theology, most notably with copious allusions to the Athanasian Creed and mimicking authors like Augustine. However, since Richard's arguments are not easy to grasp, the material below sketches and evaluates one book at a time, highlighting his contributions to Trinitarian thinking.

Richard appears to follow what became a standard scholastic model for treating the doctrine of God, moving from God's existence (*an sit Deus*), to what kind of God he is (*quails sit Deus*), to who he is (*quis sit Deus*). For this reason, books 1–2 treat divine being in general and divine qualities or attributes, respectively. Both sections provide ample arguments both for divine oneness and simplicity as necessary presuppositions for understanding God's attributes and triunity. Particularly, book 2 both assumes and proves simplicity by illustrating how and why all divine perfections imply one another. This is a moving and effective means of defending a doctrine that has become so controverted in recent theology, giving modern readers ample food for thought on the importance of divine simplicity. Setting the stage for treating the divine persons, Richard argued that there are three kinds of being: that which exists from itself and is eternal, that which does not exist from itself and is created, and that which does not exist from itself yet is still eternal. Through the last category, he made room for the eternal generation of the Son and the Spirit. In contrast to some other medieval authors, most notably Anselm, he excludes self-existence from the Son and the Spirit while still affirming their eternality and equality by generation and procession.

Turning to the plurality of persons in God, book three follows a four-stage argument. First, whether there is plurality in God and whether this amounts to three persons. Second, in what way it is fitting to have one substance with three persons. Third, whether one person is from himself and whether the others proceed from him. Fourth, whether their proper modes of procession differ. Richard sought to provide grounds for these things through reason rather than from the

Fathers or from Scripture explicitly (120), seeking to deepen understanding of what the church must believe. Along the way, Richard drew from his treatment of the divine attributes to show that things like fullness of goodness, felicity, glory, etc. mandated a plurality of divine persons, love tying together every applied attribute (e.g., 122–5). Putting books 1–3 together, he argued from unity, to plurality, to threeness (beginning in bk. 3, ch. 11, 134). Lover and beloved requires mutual love (*condilectionis*) to constitute the highest and divine form of love (ch. 19, 144). Condilection is necessary for perfection in divine love alone, which transcends human love. This point about lover, loved, and *condilectus* is simultaneously the most challenging aspect of Richard's work and his most distinctive contribution to ongoing discussions of the Trinity.

Book four builds on plurality in God, pulling towards the Trinity by defining personhood. In books 4–5, Richard explains why the Holy Spirit directed the church to use the term "person," which he preferred over "substistence." While "animal" applied to all sensible substances, "person" applied only to rational substances, which is one sole and singular substance (166). This approximately echoed Boethius's famous definition of person as an individual substance of a rational nature, with some terminological differences. Under the *intelligenitia* of substance is the *subintelligentia* of properties common to all animals, and *subintelligentia* of man are properties common to all human beings, and under the name person "*subintelligetur*" certain properties fitting to one only and designated by a proper name.

His categories of intelligence and subintelligence thus lead from one general category of substance, to animal, to man, to person, each subintelligent category being more precise and narrower than the last. The question of personhood, then, sought to relate specific categories in relation to general ones. Translating intelligence and subintelligence is admittedly difficult here, and the translator opted for "substance" and "property" (167). While losing the tight logical connections of the Latin text, this conveys the general meaning well enough. Perhaps chapter 16 is the source of John Calvin's later restriction of eternal generation to the Son's personhood to the exclusion of communication of essence, since Richard argued that it is proper for divine substance to have its being from itself, but proper for divine persons to originate from another person (178). If so, then this diverged from the standard medieval (and Reformed) model of viewing eternal generation as communication of the divine essence through personal subsistence. However, Richard later assigned self-existence to the Father alone as an incommunicable property of his personal existence, which would make Calvin uneasy (bk. 4, ch. 4, 208). Richard ultimately defined person in God as incommunicable existence, or

incommunicable property, reflecting the origin of the person (ch. 18). Chapters 20 and following modify Boethius's famous definition of personhood as an individual substance of a rational nature by shifting towards person as individual existence of a rational substance, marked by a singular incommunicable property. Richard's concern was to define personhood in a way that could apply to all persons, whether divine, angelic, or human (ch. 25). In his mind, "existence" indicated a relationship to a broader category of being (*sistere*).

Reintegrating the theme of divine love, book 5 examines the personal properties of the divine persons, stressing what makes them distinct persons via incommunicable existence. Chapters 11–12 particularly illustrate his method of arguing where he presses the idea that there must be a (third) person in the divinity who is from the other two and from whom no other person proceeds (225–6). Failing to maintain one person whose existence is of none, one person proceeding from him immediately, and a third proceeding from both immediately and mediately, would result in an infinite number of persons in God, which none admit. Such arguments draw from the three modes of being Richard established in book 1. One significant fact pervading this book is that the *filioque* was integral to Richard's thinking. The Spirit's distinct personal existence is definable only by his immediate and mediate procession from two other persons, since the Son's procession is only immediate. Moreover, the Spirit is a distinct divine existence in that no other proceeds from him. If no other person proceeded from the Son, and if the Spirit's procession was immediate from the Father and not also mediate through the Son, then it would be impossible to distinguish the Spirit's personal existence from the Son's. Thus, the *filioque* is essential to the Spirit's distinct personal existence. Chapters 13–14 argue along the same lines by highlighting the Son's procession in the middle of the other two persons, both proceeding from another with another proceeding from him. The notable point is that without the *filioque*, Richard believed that it was impossible to produce a coherent Trinitarian theology (226). Chapters 17–19 argue along the same lines, from Father, to Spirit, then to Son, using the categories of the fullness of gratuitous love, owed love, and gratuitous and owed love together. Again, the Son came last in the discussion because he is the middle person, who proceeds from one and from whom one proceeds. The latter chapters of this book filter such assertions through divine love once again.

Only after establishing plurality and two kinds of processions in God, resulting in three incommunicable existences, does Richard assign the proper names of Father, Son, and Spirit to the persons in book 6. Chapter one sets the tone for assessing the Son as Image and Word and the name of the Holy Spirit by

looking at man as God's image. Even though man is more unlike God than like him, Richard argued (like Augustine) that we can still learn something about God from man as his image (248). Once again, the *filioque* was central to distinguishing the personal properties of the Son and the Spirit (chs. 8–9). Through a complex yet compact series of arguments, Richard explained names assigned to the Son and the Spirit. For example, in chapter 10, he argued that the Spirit is called Holy both because he perfects the love between Father and Son in God himself (*condilectus*), and by likeness in man because he is the source of all created holiness (262). This illustrates how he could explain the Trinity by reflection in man as God's image, while showing that God remains unlike human beings even while they are like him. Chapter 11 interestingly adds that the only reason why the Son can be called Image while the Spirit cannot is that the Son produces another person with the Father, while the Spirit only receives, making the *filioque* essential to the Trinity (264). Books 3–6 continually allude to the language of the Athanasian Creed as well, seeking to promote better understanding of the catholic faith.

Some observations are in order about Richard's distinct definition of personhood since it modified Boethius and passed into later Christian thinking. Richard is known for defining personhood in the Trinity in terms of incommunicable properties of existences (see bk. 4, chs. 16–18). As he built ideas in this direction, book 2 chapter 12 illustrates the complexity and clarity marking his arguments. Beginning with human beings, he argued that all being has substance, substantiality, and subsistence. Substance defines what a thing is, but it becomes being only through substantiality. Substantiality describes what all things in a class have in common communicably, but subsistence marks individuals alone and is incommunicable. Thus, human beings substantially share humanity as a species, but a particular human being, whom he calls Daniel, posseses incommunicable properties, "Danielity" in this case. Yet divine substantiality is identical with the divine substance which is one and simple. This distinction is why divinity is incommunicable to humanity (98–9). The missing step here is that personhood, or subsistence, in God is an incommunicable property in which the one divine substance subsists substantially in three persons. Later illustrating the difference between divine and human persons, he concludes that in God there is plurality of persons in unity of substance, while in humanity there is plurality of substance in unity of person (bk. 3, ch. 9, 130–2). While complex, this line of reasoning illustrates a great difference between pre-modern and modern views of personhood, which often muddle modern treatments of the Trinity. Post-Enlightenment, personhood became an individual willing subject,

or self-consciousness. Pre-Enlightenment personhood, however, related individual instances of a general category to subsistences within a species. If the divine essence is one and indivisible, then the result is that the three persons in God must have a single will and every divine attribute in common. Only their incommunicable qualities distinguish them. It is no surprise in this light that many post-Enlightenment constructions of the Trinity posit various forms of social Trinitarianism, resulting in things like three wills in God, eternal subordination among the persons, or collapsing God's incommunicable being into the processes of human history. We are simply working with different definitions of subsistence/personhood, often without being aware of the fact. Instead of understanding personhood in God and humanity in exactly the same way, Richard concluded that we should know the differences between them in light of divine unity and simplicity (132). Stated theologically, personhood in God and humanity are analogical rather than univocal terms, each requiring their own definition (bk. 4, chs. 21–22). Working through such issues could bring greater clarity in much modern Trinitarian theology.

Sometimes Richard's speculative reasoning that the perfect and highest love necessitates three divine persons creates tensions in Trinitarian thinking. For example, he argued that coeternal persons seem to rest in God's immutable will for self-communication (128). This seems to contradict the scholastic tradition more broadly, in which divine works *ad intra* are not acts of the divine will but necessitated by the divine nature (which Richard still affirms in bk. 3, ch. 11, 134). Moreover, Richard sometimes sounds like the divine persons have equal yet multiple wills rather than a single divine will (Bk. 3, ch. 15, 140). The Father wills to communicate his love, the Son wills to receive the Father's love, and the Spirit is the love between them (*condilectus*). His intricate arguments along such lines will likely tax even those most familiar with classical Trinitarian thought. Potentially, his line of reasoning could simultaneously divide the divine will without disunifying the persons and reduce the divine persons to acts of will rather than essence. Implying that the Spirit is the love between two willing subjects (lover and loved) may also lead to depersonalizing the Spirit or making him an object rather than an actor in the divine will. As a counter point, however, readers should note that Richard appealed persistently to the immutability of the divine attributes, pressing even *ad intra* acts of the divine will back into God's eternal unchangeable nature. Remember that Richard's purpose was, assuming credal Trinitarian theology, to provide philosophical reasons explaining what the church believed rather than establishing the doctrine from Scripture and the church fathers. By his own admission, this kind of reasoning was liable to

breakdown without calling Trinitarian doctrine itself into question.

Placing the Latin text alongside the translation is a great benefit in this volume. For those looking to practice their Latin, Richard's Latin is not very difficult. His sentences are short, and his ideas crisp and clear. As with any English translation, the translated text does not always fully capture the original, especially in terms of word plays and parallelisms (e.g., *si in huismodi studio studiosas mentas potero…adiuvare* becomes "help the eager minds," 62–3). Sometimes translations are ideological without losing substance, such as translating *iterum* as "here on earth" (52–3, 62–3; etc.). The context, however, could also demand "in the meantime," reflecting better Richard's stress on faith leading to hope and hope to love. Other times the English translation loses the precision and beauty of the Latin text. For example, the English text reads, "So, you ascend into the first heaven by yourself, into the second by means of virtues, and into the third in your mind" (55). Yet, the original states more literally that "therefore [the mind] ascends to the first heaven *actualiter*, to the second *virtualiter*, and to the third *intellectualiter* (54). Mental contemplation is in view in all three cases, and not merely in the third, as the English translation leads readers to believe. The idea is that we move from our actual existence, by the virtues, to mental contemplation of God. Nuanced differences between apprehension and comprehension also drop out of translation, since the author translates both terms as knowledge and understanding (e.g., 59, 65, comprehension missing entirely on 77). This lack of nuance is most significant when the author translates *comprehenditur* in relation to God's immensity, not being comprehended by space, as not being "understood" (90–1, 96–7). Yet God's relation to space is in view rather than our understanding of God's magnitude. The translator also fails to translate *omnipotens* consistently at points (e.g., 78–9), losing the precision and progression of Richard's argument to an extent. Likewise, he renders *sapientia*, *scientia*, and *prudentia*, as "wisdom," "knowledge," and "intelligence" (80–1), which loses the fact that Richard encompassed science and prudence under wisdom. These became key theological terms in which "intelligence" ordinarily preceded these other categories as habits of knowing, science, and prudence could highlight the intellectual and practical sides of wisdom. In another case, translating *condilectionis* as "third person" is simply irresponsible and loses Richard's argument entirely about the Spirit as shared love between Father and Son (144–5). While it is true that this is the "third person" of the Trinity, losing condilection in the translation makes Richard's argument unintelligible. Latin readers should also be aware of spelling variations in the manuscript, such as *cotidianis* in place of *quotidianis* (60). Readers with a working knowledge of Latin may find this to be an ideal text, since the English

translation is generally sound, while the Latin admits different renderings at times.

Richard has much to offer modern discussions of the Trinity. His definition of personhood and his application of divine love to the Trinity continue to generate fruitful reflection. Moreover, he made understanding even the mystery of redemption less important for eternal life than knowing the Trinity (60). Without sidelining how God saves sinners in Christ, it is important for the church to recognize that redemption is always a means to an end. The end of salvation is knowing the Triune God, which is eternal life. In a time when the church has often displaced the Trinity with the doctrine of salvation, Richard reminds us of the correct order of things. Redemption is vital, and without it we cannot know God. Yet it is possible to get redemption right generally while losing sight of why God redeems us. While not for everyone, this book is a useful advanced text in Trinitarian theology that will stretch serious readers beyond commonplace ideas about the Trinity.

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